Linear-Quadratic $N$-person and Mean-Field Games with Ergodic Cost by Bardi, Martino & Priuli, Fabio S.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
1.
14
21
v2
  [
ma
th.
AP
]  
9 J
ul 
20
14
Linear-Quadratic N -person and
Mean-Field Games with Ergodic Cost
Martino Bardi
∗
and Fabio S. Priuli
†
October 30, 2018
Abstract
We consider stochastic differential games with N players, linear-Gaussian dynamics in
arbitrary state-space dimension, and long-time-average cost with quadratic running cost.
Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the
existence of affine Nash equilibria by means of an associated system of N Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman andN Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck partial differential equations. We give necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of quadratic-Gaussian solutions
in terms of the solvability of suitable algebraic Riccati and Sylvester equations. Under
a symmetry condition on the running costs and for nearly identical players we study the
large population limit, N tending to infinity, and find a unique quadratic-Gaussian solution
of the pair of Mean Field Game HJB-KFP equations. Examples of explicit solutions are
given, in particular for consensus problems.
Keywords: N-person differential games, mean field games, linear-quadratic problems, stochas-
tic control, feedback Nash equilibria, multi-agent control, large population limit, consensus
problems.
1 Introduction
We consider a system of N stochastic differential equations
dX it = (A
iX it − αit)dt+ σidW it , X i0 = xi ∈ Rd , i = 1, . . . , N , (1)
where Ai, σi are given d × d matrices, with det(σi) 6= 0, (W 1t , . . . ,WNt ) are N independent
d–dimensional standard Brownian motions, and αit : [0,+∞[→ Rd is a process adapted to W it
which represents the control of the i–th player of the differential game that we now describe.
For each initial positions X = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ RNd we consider for the i–th player controls whose
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associated process is ergodic and the long–time–average cost functional with quadratic running
cost
J i(X,α1, . . . , αN ) := lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
(αit)
TRiαit
2
+ (Xt −Xi)TQi(Xt −Xi) dt
]
, (2)
where E denotes the expected value, Ri are positive definite symmetric d× d matrices, Qi are
symmetric Nd×Nd matrices, and Xi ∈ RNd are given reference positions.
For this N–person game we study the following two problems:
1. the synthesis of Nash equilibrium strategies in feedback form, and of the probability dis-
tribution for the position of each player at the equilibrium, from a system of elliptic partial
differential equations associated to the game,
2. the large population limits as N → ∞ of these strategies and distributions and their con-
nection with the Mean-Field Games partial differential equations introduced by Lasry and Li-
ons [30, 32].
The first problem is classicaly formulated within the theory of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations associated toN -person differential games, as was done in [8, 9] for compact state space.
This leads to a system of N PDEs in RNd strongly coupled in the gradients of the unknown value
functions. Instead, we exploit the independence of the dynamics of different players, that makes
the game merely cost-coupled, and follow the approach of Lasry and Lions [30, 32] leading to
a system of N nonlinear PDEs in Rd of HJB type coupled with N Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck
equations for the invariant measure of the process associated to the Nash equilibrium. This
has several advantages, including a much weaker coupling of the new system of PDEs. We
refer to [4] for more information on the connections between the two approaches. In view of
the Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian structure of the game we look for solutions of the HJB-KFP
system in the class of quadratic value functions and multivariate Gaussian distributions and
give necessary and sufficient conditions for both existence and uniqueness of solutions in this
class. This produces Nash equilibria in the form of affine feedbacks.
The second problem is set in the framework of nearly identical players, as in [2]. We first
characterize the existence and uniqueness of identically distributed solutions, then take the limit
of these solutions as N →∞ and show that it solves the system of two Mean-Field Games PDEs
in Rd 
−tr
(
σσT
2 D
2v
)
+
1
2
∇vTR−1∇v −∇vTAx+ λ = Vˆ [m](x)
−tr
(
σσT
2 D
2m
)
− div (m · (R−1∇v −Ax)) = 0∫
Rd
m(x) dx = 1 , m > 0 ,
(3)
in the unknowns (v,m, λ), with v,m ∈ C2(Rd) and λ ∈ R, where tr and div are the trace of
a matrix and the divergence operator, respectively, and Vˆ [m] is an integral operator sending
probability densities into quadratic polynomials defined in terms of the blocks of the matrix Qi.
Moreover, the solution obtained in the large population limit is the unique having v quadratic
and m Gaussian. We also show that such solution is unique among general solutions of (3)
under a condition on a submatrix of Qi meaning that imitation is not rewarding in the large
population limit.
The strategy of proof for both problems is the same: we insert the coefficients of the quadratic
value function and of the Gaussian distribution into the system of partial differential equations
and we show that this reduces the problem to the solvability of an algebraic Riccati equation
and a Sylvester equation. Besides proving the existence of solutions these matrix equations can
be used to solve explicitly some examples or can be solved numerically in more complex cases.
There is a large literature on the numerical resolution of Riccati equations for which we refer,
e.g., to [13] and its bibliography.
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We find explicit formulas for the solutions of (3) in the case the diffusion matrix σ and the
cost matrix R are constants times the identity matrix, and the drift A of the system is either a
symmetric or a non-defective matrix. In particular we treat cost functionals depending on the
state via the quadratic form
F i(X1, . . . , XN) =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
(X i −Xj)TPN (X i −Xj), i = 1, . . . , N, (4)
with PN → Pˆ > 0, a model arising in consensus problems. We recall that a consensus process
aims at reaching an agreement among several agents on some common state properties. This is
an active area of research within multi-agent control and coordination. We refer to [36] for the
motivations of consensus problems, their connection with mean field control theory, and refer-
ences to the large literature on the subject. Note that the cost functional (4) pushes the players
to take positions close to each other. We show the existence of a quadratic-Gaussian solution
with mean µ for each solution of Aiµ = 0. Therefore such solutions and the corresponding Nash
equilibria can be infinitely many: note that here imitation is rewarding.
Most of the results of this paper and explicit formulas for the solutions were derived by the
first-named author in [2] in the case of 1–dimensional state space, i.e., d = 1, where the analysis
is much simpler because the search for quadratic-Gaussian solutions leads to scalar polynomial
equations of degree at most two. For d > 1, instead, we arrive at some nontrivial algebraic
Riccati equations coupled with Sylvester equations that require a much heavier use of matrix
algebra and do not admit explicit solutions in general. In a sequel of the present paper [37]
the second-named author studies several singular limits of the N -person and Mean-Field games
considered here, such as the vanishing viscosity, the cheap control, and the vanishing discount
limit.
Linear-Quadratic differential games have a large literature, see the books [6, 19] and the
references therein. Large population limits for multi-agent systems were studied by Huang,
Caines and Malhame, independently of Lasry-Lions. They introduced a method named Nash
certainty equivalence principle [24, 25, 26] that first produces a feedback from a mean-field
equation and then shows that it is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the N -person game if N is large
enough. We cannot review here the number of papers inspired by their approach, but let us
mention [34] and [11] for LQ problems, [7] about robust control, [35] for recent progress on
nonlinear systems, [36] for consensus problems, [29] on the rate of convergence as N → ∞,
and the references therein. Some of these papers also deal with ergodic cost functionals, e.g.,
[26, 34], but their assumptions and methods differ from ours.
Concerning the Lasry-Lions approach to MFG, besides their pioneering papers [30, 31, 32]
let us mention the lecture notes [15] and [23], [1] on numerical methods, [21] on discrete games,
[16] on the long time behaviour of solutions, [20] on the large population limit for nonlinear
ergodic control of several populations, and the thesis [17] on multi-population models. A very
recent survey on MFG focusing on the comparison with the theory of mean-field type control is
[10]. There is a wide spectrum of applications of Mean-Field Games that we do not try to list
here and refer instead to the quoted literature.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we define admissible strategies, introduce
the system of HJB–KFP PDEs associated to the N–person game and recall some known facts
about matrices and algebraic Riccati equations. In Section 3 we present our main result about
Nash equilibrium strategies for the N–players game. In Section 4 we define the games with
nearly identical players and give the existence and uniqueness result in that case. Section 5 is
devoted to the analysis of the limit when the number of players tends to infinity, under natural
rescaling assumptions on the matrix coefficients of the game. Finally, in Section 6 we present
various explicit sufficient conditions for the validity of the previous theory and some explicit
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solutions, in particular for consensus problems.
Some selected results of this paper were presented at the 52nd IEEE-CDC in Florence,
December 2013 [5].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Some properties of symmetric matrices
In the following, we will use the notation Matd×d(R) for the linear space of real d× d matrices,
Symd for the subspace of real symmetric d× d matrices and Id for the identical d× d matrix.
Given a matrix M ∈ Symd, we say that M is positive semidefinite (resp. positive definite)
if for all x ∈ Rd there holds xTMx ≥ 0 (resp. if for all x ∈ Rd \ {0} there holds xTMx > 0).
We will also use the notation Sym+d for the set of real symmetric and positive definite d × d
matrices.
Finally, given a (real) d × d matrix M , we denote its spectrum by spec(M). Recall that
eigenvalues of a matrix M depend continuously on the coefficients of the matrix (see [38]), so
that if we have Mn → M , then in particular the eigenvalues of Mn converge to eigenvalues of
M .
We summarize in the following proposition some facts that will be used to prove our results.
Proposition 2.1 The following facts hold.
(i) Let H ∈ Symd and K ∈ Sym+d . Then, HK is diagonalizable with real eigenvalues. More-
over, the number of positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of HK is equal to the number of
positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of H. The same holds for KH.
(ii) By defining for every matrix M ∈ Symd
‖M‖ := max {|ℓ| ; ℓ ∈ spec(M)} , (5)
we obtain a norm. Moreover, if M is positive semidefinite, then ‖M‖ is simply the largest
eigenvalue of M , i.e.
‖M‖ = max spec(M) .
(iii) Let H,K ∈ Symd be positive semidefinite matrices and let L ∈ Sym+d . If H−K is positive
semidefinite, then ‖H‖ ≥ ‖K‖ and
max spec(HL) ≥ max spec(KL) .
Sketch of the proof. We refer to [38] for a proof of (i) and (ii). Concerning (iii), the part about
‖H‖ ≥ ‖K‖ follows from Weyl’s inequalities (see [38]): by setting λ∗(M) := max spec(M), we
obtain
‖K‖ = λ∗(K) ≤ λ∗(H) + λ∗(K −H) ≤ λ∗(H) = ‖H‖ .
The remaining part requires to recall that the spectrum of a matrix remains the same under
changes of basis, and that H − K ≥ 0 implies MTHM −MTKM ≥ 0 for all matrices M ∈
Matd×d(R). Therefore, we obtain
λ∗(HL) = λ∗(
√
LHL(
√
L)−1) = λ∗(
√
LH
√
L) ≥ λ∗(
√
LK
√
L) = λ∗(KL) ,
and this completes the proof. ⋄
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2.2 Admissible strategies
We consider strategies whose corresponding solution to (1) is ergodic.
Definition 2.1 A strategy αit is said to be admissible (for the i–th player) if it is a process
adapted to the Brownian motion W it , with E[|αit|2] bounded on [0, T ] for all T , and such that
the corresponding solution X it to (1) satisfies
• E[(X it)(X it )T ] is bounded on [0, T ] for every T ;
• X it is ergodic in the following sense: there exists a probability measure mi = mi(αi) on
R
d such that ∫
Rd
|x| dmi(x) <∞
∫
Rd
|x|2 dmi(x) <∞
and
lim
T→+∞
1
T
E
[∫
Rd
g(X it) dt
]
=
∫
Rd
g(x) dmi(x) ,
locally uniformly w.r.t. the initial state X i0, for all functions g which are polynomials of
degree at most 2.
Below, we prove that affine strategies are admissible. Preliminarily, let us introduce the notation
N (µ, V ) for a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean µ ∈ Rd and covariance V ∈ Sym+d ,
i.e. a distribution with density
γ exp
{
− 1
2
(x− µ)TV −1(x− µ)
}
, where γ := (2π)−d/2
√
det(V ) .
Moreover, we say that a probability measure is an invariant measure for the process Xt in R
d if∫
Rd
E[φ(Xt) |X0 = y] dµ(y) =
∫
Rd
φ(x) dµ(x)
for all t ≥ 0 and φ : Rd → R bounded and uniformly continuous.
Proposition 2.2 For the affine feedback
αi(x) = Kix+ ci , x ∈ Rd , (6)
with Ki ∈ Matd×d(R) such that the matrix Ai−Ki has only eigenvalues with negative real part,
and ci ∈ Rd, consider the process αit := αi(X it) where X it solves
dX it = [(A
i −Ki)X it − ci]dt+ σidW it . (7)
Then αit is admissible. Moreover, the process X
i
t has a unique invariant measure m
i given by a
multivariate Gaussian N (µ, V ) with mean µ = (Ai −Ki)−1ci and covariance matrix V which
satisfies the algebraic relation
(Ai −Ki)V + V (Ai −Ki)T + σi(σi)T = 0 , (8)
and X it is ergodic w.r.t. such a measure m
i.
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Remark 2.1 Note that the equation (8) satisfied by the covariance matrix V admits a unique
solution. Indeed, it is a Sylvester equation of the form
MY + Y N = −σi(σi)T ,
with M = NT , so that the matrices M and −N have no eigenvalues in common (see [19,
Lemma 2.31]).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. It is well known (see for instance [14, Theorem 4.3]) that given a matrix
M ∈ Matd×d(R) whose eigenvalues have all strictly negative real part, it is always possible to
find a matrix P ∈ Sym+d such that MTP + PM = −I. We now claim that, by denoting with
P i the symmetric positive definite matrix corresponding to M = Ai − Ki, V (x) := xTP ix
is a Lyapunov–like function for the system (7). Indeed, by denoting with L the infinitesimal
generator of the process, we have
LV (x) = tr
(
σi(σi)T
2
P i
)
+ xTP i(Ai −Ki)x+ ((Ai −Ki)x)TP ix = tr(σi(σi)T
2
P i
)
− |x|2 ,
which is strictly negative outside a ball of radius R >
√
σi(σi)T
2 P
i. Hence, the existence of a
unique invariant measure mi for (7) follows by exploiting the theory of Khasminskii [28] or the
results in [3]. Observing that if a unique invariant measure exists, then such a measure is also
ergodic in the sense of Definition 2.1 (see e.g. [18, Theorem 5.16]), we have verified the second
property required by admissibility.
It is well known (cf. [27, Section 5.6]) that, for solutions of linear stochastic equations (7), the
mean vector mi(t) := E[X
i
t ] and the covariance matrix vi(t) := E[(X
i
t )(X
i
t)
T ] are respectively
solutions of
m˙i(t) = (A
i −Ki)mi(t)− ci ,
and
v˙i(t) = (A
i −Ki) vi(t) + vi(t)(Ai −Ki)T + σi(σi)T ,
whence boundedness of first and second moments follows.
Finally, since a multivariate Gaussian N (µ, V ) with µ = (Ai −Ki)−1ci and V solving (8) is
indeed a stationary solution of (7), by uniqueness we get mi = N (µ, V ). ⋄
2.3 Algebraic Riccati equations
We recall here some basic facts about algebraic Riccati equations (ARE in the following).
Proposition 2.3 Consider the ARE
YRY −Q = 0 (9)
with R ∈ Sym+d and Q ∈ Symd, and introduce the following notations
ΞS :=
[
Id
S
]
∈Mat2d×d(R) , H :=
(
0 R
Q 0
)
∈ Mat2d×2d(R) , (10)
where S is any element of Matd×d(R), and ImΞS for the d–dimensional linear subspace of R
2d
spanned by the columns of ΞS. Then the following facts hold.
(i) Y is a solution of (9) if and only if ImΞY is H–invariant, i.e. if and only if Hξ ∈ ImΞ
for all ξ ∈ ImΞ.
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(ii) If the matrix H has no purely imaginary nonzero eigenvalues, then equation (9) has solu-
tions Y such that Y = Y T .
(iii) If Q is positive definite, then all eigenvalues of H are real and different from zero, and
equation (9) has a unique symmetric solution Y such that the matrix RY has only positive
eigenvalues. In particular,
spec(RY ) = spec(H) ∩ (0,+∞) , (11)
and Y is also the unique symmetric positive definite solution to (9).
Sketch of the proof. The proof follows from standard arguments about Riccati equations that
can be found in [19, 33]. We give here some explicit references for sake of completeness. Part (i)
is contained in Proposition 7.1.1 of [33]. Part (ii) is a particular case of Theorem 8.1.7 in [33].
Concerning (iii), if we assume Q positive definite, then ℓ is an eigenvalue for H if and only if ℓ
is a solution of the equation
0 = det(H− ℓI2d) = det
( −ℓId R
Q −ℓId
)
= det(ℓ2Id −RQ)
i.e. if and only if ℓ2 is an eigenvalue of the d× d matrix RQ. But we are assuming that both R
and Q are positive definite, so RQ has only positive eigenvalues and therefore all eigenvalues
of H are in R \ {0}. Now Theorem 8.3.2 of [33] ensures that there is a unique solution Y of (9)
in Symd such that RY has only positive eigenvalues and such solution is characterized by (11).
In turn, (11) implies that Y ∈ Sym+d . Finally, assume there is another solution Z ∈ Sym+d ,
then RZ would have only positive eigenvalues too, and hence we would have Z = Y by the
characterization above. ⋄
2.4 HJB and KFP equations associated to the N–person game
We focus our attention on the game (1)–(2), in order to write the system of HJB–KFP equations
associated to the game (1)–(2), as in [2, 30, 32]. We start by remarking that the part of the
cost depending on the state of the game can be also written as
F i(X1, . . . , XN) := (X −Xi)TQi(X −Xi) =
N∑
j,k=1
(Xj −Xij)TQijk(Xk −Xi
k
) (12)
where the matrices Qijk are d × d blocks of Qi. The standing assumptions on the game are
summed up in the following condition.
(H) Assume that σi in (1) are invertible matrices, that Ri in (2) belong to Sym+d and that Q
i
in (2) are symmetric matrices. Moreover, assume that blocks Qiii belong to Sym
+
d as well.
Remark 2.2 Each block Qijk collects the costs for player i per unit of displacement of players j
and k from their reference positions Xi
j
and Xi
k
, respectively. The assumption Qiii > 0 means
that his own reference position Xi
i
is a preferred position for the i–th player. This condition
has a clear interpretation and makes some calculations easier, but for the validity of Theorem 1
it can be weakened to Qiii + (A
i)TRiAi/2 > 0.
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For the game (1)–(2) under consideration, we observe that the i-th Hamiltonian takes the
form
Hi(x, p) := min
ω
{
−ωT R
i
2
ω − pT (Aix− ω)} = −pTAix+min
ω
{
−ωT R
i
2
ω − pTω
}
.
Since the minimum is attained at (Ri)−1p, we get
Hi(x, p) = −((Ri)−1p)T R
i
2
((Ri)−1p)− pT (Aix− (Ri)−1p) = pT (Ri)−1
2
p− pTAix .
we introduce the notations
f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN ) :=
∫
Rd(N−1)
F i(ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, x, ξi+1, . . . ξN )
∏
j 6=i
dmj(ξj) , (13)
for any N–vector of probability measures (m1, . . . ,mN ), and
νi :=
(σi)(σi)T
2
∈Matd×d(R) .
The classical system of N Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations in RNd whose solutions generate
Nash feedback equilibria is, for i = 1, . . . , N ,
−
N∑
j=1
tr(νiD2xjv
i) +Hi(xi,∇xivi) +
∑
j 6=i
∂Hj
∂p
(xj ,∇xjvj) · ∇xjvi + λi = F i(X), (14)
see [8, 9] and the references therein, where X := (x1, . . . , xN ), and the unknowns are vi(X)
and the constants λi, i = 1, . . . , N . Note that this system of PDEs is strongly coupled via the
terms ∇xjvj appearing in the i-th equation. In view of the independence of the dynamics of the
different players we follow the approach by Lasry and Lions [30, 32] and suppose the solution
vi of (14) depends only on xi, i = 1, . . . , N . We consider the linearization around vi of the i-th
equation of (14), that is,
−tr(νiD2mi)− div
(
mi
∂Hi
∂p
(x,∇vi)
)
= 0, in Rd, i = 1, . . . , N,
and assume this system has positive solutions mi with
∫
Rd
mi(x) dx = 1. Next we multiply
the i-th equation in (14) by Πj 6=im
j(xj) and integrate over R(N−1)d with respect to dxj , j 6= i.
Then we arrive at the system of HJB–KFP equations in Rd
−tr(νiD2vi) +Hi(x,∇vi) + λi = f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN)
−tr(νiD2mi)− div
(
mi
∂Hi
∂p
(x,∇vi)
)
= 0
∫
Rd
mi(x) dx = 1 , mi > 0,
i = 1, . . . , N (15)
where vi : Rd → R, λi are real numbers and, with a slight abuse of notations, we have denoted
with mi a measure as well as its density. As in [2], since we are not in the periodic setting of [30,
32], the solutions vi are expected to be unbounded and cannot be normalized by prescribing
the value of their average. This is the system we will study in the next two sections. It will be
fully justified by Theorem 1, where we construct directly a Nash equilibrium in feedback form
from a solution of (15) without resorting to the harder system (14).
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3 N–person game
First of all, define the following auxiliary matrix B ∈MatNd×Nd(R) as
B := (Bαβ)α,β=1,...,N , Bαβ := −Qααβ − δαβ (Aα)TRαAα2 ∈Matd×d(R) , (16)
where δαβ is the Kronecker delta, and an auxiliary vector
P :=

−∑Nj=1Q11j X1j
...
−∑Nj=1QNNj XNj
 ∈ RNd . (17)
Also, denote with [B, P ] ∈ MatNd×(Nd+1)(R) the matrix whose columns are the columns of B
and the vector P , i.e.
[B, P ] := (B1, . . . ,BNd, P ) , (18)
being Bj the columns of the matrix B. With these notations we can state the following conditions
for existence and uniqueness of solution to the associated system of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
and Kolmogorov–Fokker–Planck equations.
(E) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, every symmetric and positive definite solution Y of the algebraic
Riccati equation
Y
νiRiνi
2
Y =
(Ai)TRiAi
2
+Qiii , (19)
is also a solution to the Sylvester equation
Y νiRi −RiνiY = RiAi − (Ai)TRi . (20)
Moreover, the matrices B ∈MatNd×Nd(R) and [B, P ] ∈ MatNd×(Nd+1)(R) have the same
rank, where B is the matrix defined in (16), P is the vector defined in (17), and [B, P ] is
the matrix defined in (18).
(U) The block matrix B defined by (16) is invertible.
Some explicit conditions on the data ensuring (E) are discussed in Section 6. Our main
result for the games with N players is the following.
Theorem 1 Assume that the N–players game having dynamics (1) and costs (2) satisfies as-
sumptions (H). Then, the associated system of 2N HJB–KFP equations (15) admits solutions
(vi,mi, λi)1≤i≤N of the form v
i quadratic function and mi multivariate Gaussian, i.e. of the
form
vi(x) = xT
Λi
2
x+ (ρi)Tx , mi = N (µi, (Σi)−1) , λi ∈ R , (21)
for suitable symmetric matrices Λi and Σi, Σi positive definite, and vectors ρi, µi ∈ Rd, if and
only if condition (E) is satisfied. In particular, Σi is the unique solution in Sym+d of the Riccati
equation (19), Λi = Ri(νiΣi +Ai), µ = (µ1, . . . , µN ) solves Bµ = P , and ρi = −RiνiΣiµi.
Moreover, solutions of the form (21) are unique if and only if condition (U) is satisfied and, if
this is the case, the affine feedbacks
αi(x) = (Ri)−1∇vi(x) , x ∈ Rd, i = 1, . . . , N (22)
provide a Nash equilibrium strategy for all initial positions X ∈ RNd, among the admissible
strategies, and J i(X,α) = λi for all X and all i.
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Proof. The proof will be divided in several steps. Steps 1 to 4 study the particular form taken
by system (15) when solutions are assumed to have the form (21). Step 5 proves the equivalence
between existence and (E). Step 6 proves the equivalence between uniqueness and (U). Finally,
Step 7 shows that the affine strategies (22) give a Nash equilibrium for the game (1)–(2).
Step 1. We start by inserting functions of the form (21) into the system (15), beginning with
the second equation (KFP). Notice that the hypothesis on the measure mi can be rewritten in
terms of its density, which we denote again as mi, as follows
mi(x) = γi exp
{
− 1
2
(x− µi)TΣi(x− µi)
}
, γi = (2π)−d/2
√
det(Σi) , (23)
for a matrix Σi ∈ Sym+d and a vector µi ∈ Rd. In particular, from (23) we deduce ∇mi(x) =
−mi(x)Σi(x − µi). Similarly, the condition on the value function can be rewritten in terms of
its gradient as follows
∇vi(x) = Λix+ ρi , (24)
Hence, by substituting these expressions in the second equation of (15) and recalling the ex-
pressions of Hi and ∇mi, we obtain
0 = − tr(νiD2mi)− div
(
mi
∂Hi
∂p
(x,∇vi)
)
= − div
(
νi∇mi +mi ∂H
i
∂p
(x,∇vi)
)
= div
(
mi
(
νiΣi(x− µi)− (Ri)−1∇vi +Aix)) .
Therefore, (24) implies
0 = div
(
mi
(
νiΣi(x − µi)− (Ri)−1Λix− (Ri)−1ρi +Aix))
= mi tr(νiΣi − (Ri)−1Λi +Ai)
+∇mi · [νiΣi(x− µi) + (Ai − (Ri)−1Λi)x− (Ri)−1ρi]
= −mi
{
(x − µi)TΣiνiΣi(x− µi) + (x− µi)TΣi(Ai − (Ri)−1Λi)x
− (x − µi)TΣi(Ri)−1ρi − tr(νiΣi − (Ri)−1Λi +Ai)
}
Since mi(x) > 0, this means that the other factor must vanish for every x ∈ Rd. But such a
factor is a quadratic form, and this means that its coefficients must be zero. In turn, this leads
to the following matrix relations
νiΣi − (Ri)−1Λi +Ai = 0 , νiΣiµi + (Ri)−1ρi = 0 . (25)
In conclusion, necessary and sufficient condition for having solutions to the KFP equation, of
the form (21), is that the value function vi is related to the measure mi through
Λi = Ri
(
νiΣi +Ai
)
, ρi = −RiνiΣiµi , (26)
where the equality for Λi also imposes that the matrix Ri
(
νiΣi +Ai
)
is symmetric.
Step 2. Let us consider now the first equation of (15) (HJB). By exploiting (26), we have
tr(νiD2vi) = div(νi∇vi) = div(νiRiνiΣi(x− µi) + νiRiAix) = tr(νiRiνiΣi + νiRiAi) ,
Hi(x,∇vi) = 1
2
(∇vi)T (Ri)−1∇vi − (∇vi)TAix ,
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hence the equation can be rewritten as
−tr(νiRiνiΣi + νiRiAi) + 1
2
(x − µi)TΣiνiRiνiΣi(x− µi) + 1
2
xT (Ai)TRiAix
+
1
2
(
xT (Ai)TRiνiΣi(x− µi) + (x− µi)TΣiνiRiAix
)
− (x − µi)TΣiνiRiAix− xT (Ai)TRiAix+ λi = f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN)
or, equivalently,
−tr(νiRiνiΣi + νiRiAi) + 1
2
(x− µi)TΣiνiRiνiΣi(x− µi)− 1
2
xT (Ai)TRiAix
+
1
2
(
xT (Ai)TRiνiΣi(x− µi)− (x− µi)TΣiνiRiAix
)
+ λi = f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN )
Taking into account that Ri, νi, and Σi are all symmetric matrices, the term in the second line
vanishes and we obtain
−tr(νiRiνiΣi + νiRiAi) + (x− µi)TΣi ν
iRiνi
2
Σi(x − µi)
− xT (A
i)TRiAi
2
x+ λi = f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN) (27)
We can now exploit (23) to compute explicitly the expression of f i. Indeed, since mi =
N (µi, (Σi)−1), we have
f i(X i;m1, . . . ,mN ) =
N∑
j,k=1
∫
Rd(N−1)
(Xj −Xij)TQijk(Xk −Xi
k
)
∏
ℓ 6=i
dmℓ(Xℓ)
= (X i −Xii)TQiii(X i −Xi
i
) + (X i −Xii)T
(∑
k 6=i
Qiik(µ
k −Xik)
)
+
(∑
j 6=i
(µj −Xij)TQiji
)
(X i −Xii)
+
∑
j,k 6=i ,j 6=k
(µj −Xij)TQijk(µk −Xi
k
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(
tr(Qijj(Σ
i)−1) + (µj −Xij)TQijj(µj −Xi
j
)
)
=: (X i)TF i2X
i + (X i)TF i1,1 + F
i
1,2X
i + F i0
where we have used the relation E[vTMv] = tr(MΣ−1)+(µ)TMµ, which holds for any symmetric
matrixM and any vector of random variables v whose expected value is µ and whose covariance
matrix is Σ−1, to compute explicitly the last quadratic term. For later use, we write explicitly
the expressions of F i2 , F
i
1,1, F
i
1,2 and F
i
0 :
F i2 = Q
i
ii ,
F i1,1 = −QiiiXi
i
+
(∑
j 6=i
Qiij(µ
j −Xij)
)
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F i1,2 = −(Xi
i
)TQiii +
(∑
j 6=i
(µj −Xij)TQiji
)
F i0 = (Xi
i
)TQiiiXi
i − (Xii)T
(∑
j 6=i
Qiij(µ
j −Xij)
)
−
(∑
j 6=i
(µj −Xij)TQiji
)
Xi
i
+
∑
j,k 6=i ,j 6=k
(µj −Xij)TQijk(µk −Xi
k
) +
∑
j 6=i
(
tr(Qijj(Σ
i)−1) + (µj −Xij)TQijj(µj −Xi
j
)
)
Once again, we can interpret equation (27), which is equivalent to the first equation of (15),
as an equality between quadratic forms to be satisfied for every x ∈ Rd. This means that we
must equate the corresponding coefficients. Notice that the assumption of Qi symmetric in (12)
implies that (Qijk)
T = Qikj for every j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In particular, Qiii ∈ Symd. Hence,
F i1,1 = (F
i
1,2)
T and the two conditions on the linear terms
−xT Σ
iνiRiνiΣi
2
µi = xTF i1,1 , −(µi)T
ΣiνiRiνiΣi
2
x = F i1,2x ,
do coincide. This leads to three conditions on the coefficients of the quadratic forms which have
to be satisfied by the matrices Σi, the vectors µi and the real numbers λi.
Σi
νiRiνi
2
Σi − (A
i)TRiAi
2
= F i2 (28)
− Σ
iνiRiνiΣi
2
µi = F i1,1 (29)
(µi)T
ΣiνiRiνiΣi
2
µi − tr(νiRiνiΣi + νiRiAi) + λi = F i0 (30)
Step 3. Notice that (28) is equivalent to say that Σi solves an ARE of the form (9) with
R = ν
iRiνi
2
, Q = (A
i)TRiAi
2
+Qiii .
Hence, its solutions can be found as d–dimensional invariant graph subspaces of the 2d × 2d
matrix H defined in (10). Since our standing assumptions (H) imply that both R and Q are
positive definite, we can apply Proposition 2.3 (ii)–(iii) to conclude that (28) has a unique
solution Σi in Sym+d , representing the inverse of the covariance matrix for our multivariate
Gaussian mi.
Step 4. Concerning (29), we can rewrite the condition as
− Σ
iνiRiνiΣi
2
µi −
∑
j 6=i
Qiijµ
j = −
N∑
j=1
Qiij Xi
j
(31)
or equivalently, by collecting the relations (31) for i = 1, . . . , N ,
B
 µ
1
...
µN
 = P (32)
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where B is the Nd × Nd matrix defined in (16) and P is the vector in RNd defined by (17).
Here, we have also used the fact that each Σp solves the Riccati equation (28) to rewrite the
terms Bpp as
Bpp = − Σ
pνpRpνpΣp
2
= − (A
p)TRpAp
2
−Qppp ,
i.e. in the form expected in (16). Finally, (30) becomes
λi = F i0 − (µi)T
ΣiνiRiνiΣi
2
µi + tr(νiRiνiΣi + νiRiAi) .
Step 5. So far we have mostly manipulated the equations of (15), under the assumptions (21),
arriving to an equivalent system of matrix equations (26), (28), (29), and (30).
Now let us assume that condition (E) holds. We have seen that each equation (28), for
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, is an ARE which admits a unique symmetric and positive definite solution Σi.
By (E), the matrices Σi also satisfy the Sylvester equation (20) and thus
RiνiΣi +RiAi = ΣiνiRi + (Ai)TRi =
(
RiνiΣi +RiAi
)T
,
so that, by setting Λi according to the first relation in (26), we obtain a symmetric matrix as
required. Moreover, the assumption on B and [B, P ] in (E) ensures the existence of a solution
(µ1, . . . , µN ) to the linear system (32) of Nd equations in Nd unknowns. By using the solutions
Σi and µi in (30) and in the second relation of (26), we also find admissible values λi and ρi,
and these complete the construction of a solution of the form (21).
Viceversa, let us assume that a solution of the form (21) exists for suitable matrices Λi ∈
Symd, Σ
i ∈ Sym+d , and suitable vectors ρi, µi. Then, by the analysis in Step 1, we necessarily
have (26). Furthermore, by the analysis in Step 2, Σi must solve the ARE (28) and µi and λi
must be given by solutions to (29) and (30). In particular, the system (32) admits at least a
solution, and this implies the condition on the rank of B and [B, P ]. Finally, by combining the
symmetry of Λi with (26), one has that the (unique) solution to (28) has to satisfy
0 = Λi − (Λi)T = RiνiΣi +RiAi −
(
RiνiΣi +RiAi
)T
,
which is equivalent to (20). Thus, both requirements of (E) must be necessarily satisfied.
Step 6. We now focus our attention on the uniqueness. For (28) there is nothing to prove,
because uniqueness of solution in Sym+d always follows from Proposition 2.3, under hypotheses
(H). For (29), the equivalence between (U) and the uniqueness of solution (µ1, . . . , µN ) is
evident when considering the equivalent form (32). Finally, once we have a unique choice for
the matrices (Σ1, . . . ,ΣN ) and for the vectors (µ1, . . . , µN ), the uniqueness of λi, Λi and ρi is
verified immediately.
Step 7. It remains to prove that the affine feedbacks (22) provide a Nash equilibrium strategy
for the game. Consider
αi(x) = (Ri)−1∇vi(x) = (Ri)−1(Λix+ ρi) = (νiΣi +Ai)x− νiΣiµi .
By Proposition 2.2, we know that αi(x) is admissible and that the ergodic measure associated
to the process X it which solves
dX it = [−νiΣiX it + νiΣiµi]dt+ σidW it ,
is a multivariate Gaussian N (µ, V ) with mean
µ = (−νiΣi)−1(−νiΣiµi) = µi ,
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and covariance matrix V = (Σi)−1, since
(−νiΣi)(Σi)−1 + (Σi)−1(−νiΣi)T + σi(σi)T = −2νi + σi(σi)T = 0 ,
and the equation (8) admits a unique solution (see Remark 2.1). In other words, the invariant
measure coincides with the measure mi satisfying (23).
We now consider any other admissible strategy αi and obtain from Dynkin–Itoˆ’s formula
E
[
vi(X iT )− vi(X i0)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∇vi(X is) · (AiX is − αis) + tr
(
σi(σi)T
2
D2vi(X is)
)
ds
]
.
Hence, from νi = σi(σi)T /2 and the fact that the map (x, y) 7→ xTRiy is an inner product, one
obtains
E
[
vi(X iT )− vi(X i0)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
tr(νiD2vi) + (∇vi)TAix− (∇vi)Tαis
)
(X is) ds
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
tr(νiD2vi) + (∇vi)TAix− ((Ri)−1∇vi)TRiαis)(X is) ds
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
(
tr(νiD2vi) + (∇vi)TAix− 1
2
(∇vi)T (Ri)−1∇vi
)
(X is)−
1
2
(αis)
TRiαis ds
]
= E
[∫ T
0
tr(νiD2vi(X is))−Hi(X is,∇vi(X is)) −
1
2
(αis)
TRiαis ds
]
with equality holding if αi = αi. Therefore, the first equation in (15) implies
E
[
vi(X iT )− vi(X i0)
] ≥ E[∫ T
0
λi − f i(X is)−
1
2
(αis)
TRiαis ds
]
= λiT − E
[∫ T
0
f i(X is) +
1
2
(αis)
TRiαis ds
]
Hence, by dividing by T and letting T → +∞, we get
λi ≤ lim inf
T→+∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
f i(X is) +
1
2
(αis)
TRiαis ds
]
, (33)
because the left hand side of the original inequality vanishes due to vi being quadratic and the
strategies being admissible (and therefore E[X it ] ≤ C and E[(X it)(X it )T ] ≤ C for some constant
C).
It remains to prove that the right hand side of (33) is J i(X,α1, . . . αi−1, αi, αi+1, . . . , αN ),
which means that the cost λi corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. This property follows from
the ergodicity. Indeed, let us consider the probability measures
m˜i := mi = mi(αi) , m˜j := mj = mj(αj) ∀ j 6= i ,
which are the invariant measures corresponding to the solution (X1t , . . . , X
N
t ) obtained when
players adopt the strategies (α1, . . . αi−1, αi, αi+1, . . . , αN ). By recalling that the functions f i
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are polynomials of degree less or equal to two in the variable xi, we obtain
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
f i(X is) ds
]
=
1
T
E
∫ T
0
∫
Rd(N−1)
(X −Xi)TQi(X −Xi)
∏
ℓ 6=i
dm˜ℓ(Xℓ)
 (X is) ds

=
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
h(X is) ds
]
T→∞−−−−→
∫
Rd
h(x) dm˜i(x)
=
∫
RNd
(
(X −Xi)TQi(X −Xi)
) N∏
ℓ=1
dm˜ℓ(Xℓ)
=
N∑
j=1
∫
Rd
(
(Xj −Xij)TQijj(Xj −Xi
j
)
)
dm˜j(Xj)
+
∑
j 6=k
∫
R2d
(
(Xj −Xij)TQijk(Xk −Xi
k
)
)
dm˜j(Xj) dm˜k(Xk)
= lim
T→+∞
1
T
E
 N∑
j=1
∫ T
0
(
(Xjs −Xi
j
)TQijj(X
j
s −Xi
j
)
)
ds

+ lim
T→+∞
1
T
E
∑
j 6=k
∫ T
0
(
(Xjs −Xi
j
)TQijk(X
k
s −Xi
k
)
)
ds

= lim
T→+∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
F i(X1s , . . . , X
N
s ) ds
]
where we have also used the ergodicity of the pair (Xjt , X
k
t ) with corresponding measure given
by the product measure obtained from m˜j and m˜k. In conclusion, the right hand side of (33)
is J i(X,α1, . . . αi−1, αi, αi+1, . . . , αN ) and this completes the proof. ⋄
Remark 3.1 Looking at the formulas (21) and (26) it might seem that the Nash equilibrium
strategies depend on the noise σi, through νi, which is typically not the case in LQ stochastic
problems. In fact, this is not the case in our problem either: by introducing new variables
V i := νiΣi, it is immediate to verify that the feedback strategies only depend on these new
variables V i, which are determined by the Riccati equations
(V i)T R
i
2
V i = Qiii +
(Ai)TRiAi
2
,
and thus do not depend on the noise statistics σi. The same holds for the equilibrium strategies
of Theorem 2 in the next Section. This allows to take the small noise or vanishing viscosity
limit νi → 0 under some additional conditions, extending the results on the case d = 1 in [2],
see the sequel of this paper [37].
4 Nearly identical players
In this section we introduce assumptions saying that the players are almost identical, as in [2],
and prove that there exists a Nash equilibrium with the same feedback and the same distribution
for all players, although the values can be different. The first condition is a Symmetry assumption
on the cost of each player:
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(S) every player is influenced in the same way by other players, i.e. for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and each j, k 6= i
F i(X1, . . . , Xj, . . . , Xk, . . . , XN) = F i(X1, . . . , Xk, . . . , Xj, . . . , XN)
We can easily prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Assumption (S) holds if and only if there exist matrices Bi, Ci, Di and vectors ∆i
such that
Qiij =
Bi
2
, Qijj = Ci , Xi
j
= ∆i , ∀ j 6= i ,
Qijk = Di , ∀ j, k 6= i , j 6= k .
Under assumption (S), the quadratic costs F i take the following form
F i(X1, . . . , XN) = (X i −Xii)TQiii(X i −Xi
i
)
+ (X i −Xii)T Bi
2
(∑
k 6=i
(Xk −∆i)
)
+
(∑
j 6=i
(Xj −∆i)T
) Bi
2
(X i −Xii)
+
∑
j 6=i
(Xj −∆i)TCi(Xj −∆i) +
∑
j,k 6=i ,j 6=k
(Xj −∆i)TDi(Xk −∆i)
In particular, they can be written in the form usually arising in mean field games, namely
F i(X1, . . . , XN) = V i
 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δXj
 (X i) ,
where δXj is the Dirac measure on R
d centered in the point Xj and V i is the operator, mapping
probability measures m on Rd, with finite second moments, into quadratic polynomials, defined
by the expression
V i[m](X) := (X i −Xii)TQiii(X i −Xi
i
)
+ (N − 1)
∫
Rd
(
(X i −Xii)T Bi
2
(ξ −∆i) + (ξ −∆i)T Bi
2
(X i −Xii)
)
dm(ξ)
+ (N − 1)
∫
Rd
(ξ −∆i)T (Ci −Di)(ξ −∆i) dm(ξ)
+
(
(N − 1)
∫
Rd
(ξ −∆i) dm(ξ)
)T
Di
(
(N − 1)
∫
Rd
(ξ −∆i) dm(ξ)
)
Indeed, it is enough to recall that for any choice of vectors w1, . . . , wN and of an index i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, there holds
∑
j,k 6=i ,j 6=k
wTj Diwk =
∑
j 6=i
wTj
Di
∑
j 6=i
wj
−∑
j 6=i
wTj Diwj .
Definition 4.1 We say that the players are nearly identical if costs F i satisfy (S) and if all
players have the same:
• control systems, i.e. Ai = A and σi = σ (and therefore νi = ν) for all i,
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• costs of the control, i.e. Ri = R for all i,
• reference positions, i.e. Xii = H (own reference position, or happy place) and ∆i = ∆
(reference position of the other players) for all i,
• primary costs of displacement, i.e. Qiii = Q and Bi = B for all i.
Note that the players are not fully identical because the secondary costs of displacement
Ci and Di can be different among them. Observe that in this framework, the hypotheses (H)
specialize to
det(σ) 6= 0 , R ∈ Sym+d , Q ∈ Sym+d . (34)
Let us rewrite part of the computations from the previous section for nearly identical players.
First of all, the right hand side f i (13) of the HJB equation becomes, for given measures
mi = N (µi, (Σi)−1),
f i(X i;m1, . . . ,mN) = (X i −H)TQ(X i −H)
+ (X i −H)T B
2
∑
k 6=i
(µk −∆)
+
∑
j 6=i
(µj −∆)T
 B
2
(X i −H)
+ (N − 1) tr((Ci −Di) (Σi)−1) +
∑
j 6=i
(µj −∆)T (Ci −Di)(µj −∆)
+
∑
j 6=i
(µj −∆)T
Di
∑
j 6=i
(µj −∆)

Hence, if we search for identically distributed solutions for all players, i.e. if we search for
measures of the form m1 = . . . = mN = N (µ,Σ−1), we obtain
f i(X i;m1, . . . ,mN) = (X i −H)TQ(X i −H)
+ (N − 1) (X i −H)T B
2
(µ−∆) + (N − 1) (µ−∆)T B
2
(X i −H)
+ (N − 1) tr((Ci −Di)Σ−1) + (N − 1) (µ−∆)TCi(µ−∆)
+ (N − 1)(N − 2) (µ−∆)TDi(µ−∆)
Let us investigate the existence of solutions such that
vi(x) = xT
Λ
2
x+ ρTx , mi(x) = γ exp
{
− 1
2
(x− µ)TΣ(x− µ)
}
(35)
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ,Σ, with Σ positive definite, suitable vectors µ, ρ and a suitable
constant γ depending only on the matrix Σ and on the dimension of the space. By repeating
the same computations done in Section 3, it is immediate to verify that the KFP equation in
(15) for the measure reduces, as in (26), to the matrix relations
Λ = R
(
νΣ+A
)
, ρ = −RνΣµ , (36)
By interpreting again the HJB equation for the value function in (15) as an equality between
quadratic forms we obtain the system of equations
Σ
νRν
2
Σ− A
TRA
2
= Q (37)
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− ΣνRνΣ
2
µ = −QH + (N − 1) B
2
(µ−∆) (38)
µT
ΣνRνΣ
2
µ− tr(νRνΣ + νRA) + λi = F˜ i0 (39)
with
F˜ i0 = H
TQH − (N − 1)
(
HT
B
2
(µ−∆) + (µ−∆)T B
2
H
)
+ (N − 1) tr((Ci −Di)Σ−1) + (N − 1) (µ−∆)TCi(µ−∆)
+ (N − 1)(N − 2) (µ−∆)TDi(µ−∆)
In particular, the first equation (37) has exactly the same form as (28), i.e. it is again an
ARE which admits a unique solution Σ in Sym+d , under hypotheses (34). By plugging (37) into
(38) this can be rewritten as
−
(
Q+
ATRA
2
− (1−N) B
2
)
µ = −QH + (1−N) B
2
∆ ,
which admits a unique solution µ ∈ Rd whenever the matrix
B′ := Q+ A
TRA
2
− (1−N) B
2
(40)
is invertible. Finally, once Σ and µ have been found, they can be used in the third equation (39)
and in (36) to obtain the values λi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N , the matrix Λ and the vector ρ.
For nearly identical players the appropriate analogs of the conditions (E) and (U) are the
following.
(E′) Every symmetric and positive definite solution Y of the algebraic Riccati equation
Y
νRν
2
Y =
ATRA
2
+Q , (41)
is also a solution to the Sylvester equation
Y νR−RνY = RA−ATR . (42)
Moreover, the matrices B′ ∈ Matd×d(R) and [B′, P ′] ∈ Matd×(d+1)(R) have the same rank,
where B′ is the matrix defined in (40), P ′ := −QH + (1−N) B2 ∆, and [B′, P ′] is defined
as in (18).
(U′) The matrix B′ defined in (40) is invertible.
It is immediate to verify that the analysis performed above proves the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Consider an N–players game with dynamics (1) and costs (2). Assume that play-
ers are nearly identical and that (34) holds. Then, the associated system of 2N HJB–KFP
equations (15) admits solutions (vi,mi, λi), i = 1, . . . , N , with v1 = . . . = vN = v quadratic
function and m1 = . . . = mN = N (µ,Σ−1) multivariate Gaussian, i.e. of the form (35), if and
only if condition (E′) is satisfied. In particular, Σ is the unique solution in Sym+d of the Riccati
equation (41), µ solves (38), Λ and ρ are given by (36), and λi by (39).
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Moreover, solutions of the form (35) are also unique if and only if condition (U′) is satisfied
and, if this is the case, the affine feedbacks
αi(x) = α(x) := R−1∇v(x) , x ∈ Rd, i = 1, . . . , N
provide a Nash equilibrium strategy for all initial positions X ∈ RNd, among the admissible
strategies, and J i(X,α) = λi for all X and all i = 1, . . . , N .
Remark 4.1 Note that the distribution m and the solution v found in this theorem are the
same even if the cost functionals of the players differ in the terms involving the matrices Ci
and Di. These terms only affect the values of the game λ
i (this motivates the name “secondary
costs” given to them). This result supports the existence of a large population limit, that we
study in the next section.
Remark 4.2 Note that the invertibility of B in (16) is a stronger requirement than the invert-
ibility of the matrix B′ in (40). Indeed, if we take a game such that Q+ATRA/2 = B/2 , then
B consists of blocks Bαβ = −B ∈ Matd×d(R) for all α, β = 1, . . . , N , and thus is not invert-
ible since it satisfies rank(B) = rank(B) ≤ d. On the other hand, the matrix B′ = NB/2 is
invertible, provided B is invertible. Therefore there can be infinitely many quadratic-Gaussian
solutions although only one of them is identically distributed, see [2] for an explicit example.
5 The large population limit
In this section we study the convergence of Nash equilibria when the number N of players goes
to infinity. Assume for simplicity that the control system, the costs of the control and the
reference positions are always the same, i.e. that A, σ,R,H and ∆ are all independent from the
number of players N . We denote with
QN , BN , CNi , D
N
i ,
the primary and secondary costs of displacement, respectively, which are assumed to depend
on N . We assume that these quantities, when N → +∞, tends to suitable matrices Qˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ
with their natural scaling, i.e. as N → +∞ there holds
QN → Qˆ , BN (N − 1)→ Bˆ , CNi (N − 1)→ Cˆ , DNi (N − 1)2 → Dˆ , ∀ i . (43)
We define an operator acting on probability measures with finite second moments m ∈ P2(Rd)
that describes the cost for an average player of the density m of the other players
Vˆ [m](X) := (X −H)T Qˆ(X −H)
+
∫
Rd
(
(X −H)T Bˆ
2
(ξ −∆) + (ξ −∆)T Bˆ
2
(X −H)
)
dm(ξ)
+
∫
Rd
(ξ −∆)T Cˆ(ξ −∆) dm(ξ)
+
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dm(ξ)
)T
Dˆ
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dm(ξ)
)
.
Since both V iN [m] and Vˆ [m] are quadratic forms on R
d, for all i and all m ∈ P2(Rd), it is
immediate to deduce that the convergence of the matrix coefficients in (43) implies, asN → +∞,
V iN [m](X)→ Vˆ [m](X) , locally uniformly in X .
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By denoting with λiN , vN and mN the solutions found in Theorem 2 of Section 4, we expect that
the limits of these solutions satisfy, like in [2, 30, 32], the system of two mean field HJB-KFP
equations 
−tr(νD2v) + 1
2
∇vTR−1∇v −∇vTAx+ λ = Vˆ [m](x)
−tr(νD2m)− div
(
m · (R−1∇v −Ax)
)
= 0
∫
Rd
m(x) dx = 1 , m > 0
(44)
Along the lines of hypotheses (H), the natural assumptions on the coefficients of (44) are the
following
ν ∈ Sym+d , R ∈ Sym+d , Qˆ ∈ Sym+d . (45)
We look for solutions of (44) such that
v(x) = xT
Λ
2
x+ ρTx , m(x) = γ exp
{
− 1
2
(x− µ)TΣ(x− µ)
}
(46)
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ,Σ, with Σ positive definite, suitable vectors µ, ρ and a suitable
constant γ depending only on the matrix Σ and on the dimension of the space.
By repeating the computations done in Sections 3 and 4, it is immediate to verify that the KFP
equation for the measure in (44) reduces to the matrix equations
Λ = R
(
νΣ +A
)
, ρ = −RνΣµ . (47)
Concerning the HJB equation for the value function, one can proceed as in the previous sections,
obtaining the system of matrix equations
Σ
νRν
2
Σ− A
TRA
2
= Qˆ (48)
− ΣνRνΣ
2
µ = −QˆH + Bˆ
2
(µ−∆) (49)
µT
ΣνRνΣ
2
µ− tr(νRνΣ + νRA) + λ = Fˆ0 (50)
with
Fˆ0 = H
T QˆH −
(
HT
Bˆ
2
(µ−∆) + (µ−∆)T Bˆ
2
H
)
+ tr(CˆΣ−1) + (µ−∆)T (Cˆ + Dˆ)(µ−∆)
In particular, under assumptions (45), the first equation is an ARE which admits a unique
solution Σ in Sym+d . Also, we can rewrite the second equality in the form
−
(
Qˆ+
ATRA
2
+
Bˆ
2
)
µ = −QˆH − Bˆ
2
∆ ,
which admits a unique solution µ whenever the matrix
B∞ := Qˆ+ A
TRA
2
+
Bˆ
2
(51)
is invertible. Finally, once Σ and µ have been found, one can insert them into the third equation
and (47) to obtain the value λ, the matrix Λ and the vector ρ required by (46).
In this case, the existence and uniquess of solutions to (44) is then related to the following
conditions.
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(E∞) The symmetric and positive definite solution Y of the algebraic Riccati equation
Y
νRν
2
Y =
ATRA
2
+ Qˆ , (52)
is also a solution to the Sylvester equation
Y νR−RνY = RA−ATR . (53)
Moreover, the matrices B∞ ∈ Matd×d(R) and [B∞, P∞] ∈ Matd×(d+1)(R) have the same
rank, where B∞ is the matrix defined in (51), P∞ := −QˆH + Bˆ2 ∆ ∈ Rd and [B∞, P∞] is
defined analogously to (18).
(U∞) The matrix B∞ defined in (51) is invertible.
The main results of this section are the following two theorems.
Theorem 3 (i) [Solutions to MFPDE] Assume (45). Then, the system of HJB–KFP
equations (44) admits solutions (v,m, λ) with v quadratic function and m multivariate
Gaussians N (µ,Σ−1), i.e. of the form (46), if and only if condition (E∞) is satisfied. In
particular, Σ is the unique solution in Sym+d of the Riccati equation (48), µ solves (49),
Λ and ρ are given by (47) and λ by (50).
Moreover, solutions of the form (46) are also unique if and only if condition (U∞) is
satisfied.
(ii) [Convergence as N →∞] Consider a sequence of differential games of the form (1)–(2)
with N nearly identical players and assume that (43) is verified as N →∞. Also, assume
that (34) and (E′) with Q = QN hold for all N ∈ N, and that (45), (E∞), and (U∞)
are satisfied. Then, the solutions (vN ,mN , λ
1
N , . . . , λ
N
N ) found in Theorem 2 converge as
N →∞ to the quadratic-Gaussian solution (v,m, λ) of the mean-field system (44) found in
(i) in the following sense: vN → v in C1loc(Rd) with second derivative converging uniformly
in Rd, mN → m in Ck(Rd) for all k, and λiN → λ for all i.
The uniqueness statement in the previous theorem is only among solutions of (44) with v
quadratic andm Gaussian. A natural question is whether the HJB-KFP system of PDEs admits
other C2 solutions that are not of the form (46) and therefore other mean-field equilibria. We add
a normalization condition on v, to avoid addition of constants, and make a simple assumption
that ensures the monotonicity of Vˆ with respect to the scalar product in the Lebesgue space
L2. Then an argument of Lasry and Lions [30, 32] implies uniqueness among general solutions
satisfying natural growth conditions at infinity.
Theorem 4 The integral operator Vˆ satisfies
∫
Rd
(
Vˆ [m]− Vˆ [n]
)
(x) d(m − n)(x) ≥ 0 for all
probability measures m, n ∈ P2(Rd) if and only if the matrix Bˆ is positive semidefinite.
Then for Bˆ ≥ 0 there is at most one solution (v,m, λ) of (44) with m ∈ P2(Rd), |∇v(x)| ≤
C(1 + |x|) for some C > 0, and such that v(0) = 0; in particular, under the assumptions of
Theorem 3, the solution given by that theorem is the unique solution with such properties.
Remark 5.1 The condition BN > 0 means that in the N -person game there is a positive
cost for the i-th player if his displacement with respect to his happy state H is the same as
the average displacement of the other players from their reference position ∆. Therefore the
condition Bˆ ≥ 0 in the last theorem means that imitation among players is not rewarding in
the large population limit. Note also that Bˆ ≥ 0 implies (U∞) by (45), but not viceversa.
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Proof of Theorem 3. The analysis performed on equations (47)–(50) already proves part (i). It
remains to prove part (ii). Let (vN ,mN , λ
1
N , . . . , λ
N
N ) be a solution of the differential game for
N nearly identical players found in Theorem 2. Then,
vN = x
T ΛN
2
x+ (ρN )
Tx , mN (x) = γN exp
{
− 1
2
(x− µN )TΣN (x− µN )
}
, (54)
where ΣN and µN solve equations (37) and (38), respectively, ΛN and ρN are given in terms of
ΣN and µN by (36), and γN is a constant depending only on d and the matrix ΣN . To pass to
the limit as N → +∞ in the ARE (37) we first note that (37) and (48) are both AREs of the
form (9) with
RN = R = νRν
2
QN = A
TRA
2
+QN , Q = A
TRA
2
+ Qˆ ,
and the corresponding 2d× 2d matrices of the form (10) are given by
HN =
(
0 RN
QN 0
)
, H =
(
0 R
Q 0
)
.
Next, we claim that the sequence ΣN is bounded w.r.t. the norm of the largest eigenvalue,
which was introduced in (5). Indeed, by property (iii) of Proposition 2.3
spec(RΣN ) = spec(HN ) ∩ (0,+∞) , (55)
and the convergence HN → H implies the convergence of the eigenvalues. Hence, for N large
enough
max
{
spec(RΣN )
} ≤ max{spec(H) ∩ (0,+∞)}+ 1
and in particular the maximum eigenvalue of RΣN is bounded. Since R is symmetric positive
definite, this implies that ‖ΣN‖ is bounded as well. Indeed, by denoting with λmin > 0 the
smallest eigenvalue of R, we have R− λminId ≥ 0 and
‖ΣN‖ = 1
λmin
‖λminΣN‖ ≤ max spec(RΣN ) < +∞ ,
thanks to Proposition 2.1–(iii). Therefore, ΣN has a converging subsequence, that we denote
with ΣNk , whose limit Σ satisfies (48), i.e.,
Σ
νRν
2
Σ− A
TRA
2
= Qˆ .
If we can prove that Σ ∈ Sym+d , then we have Σ = Σ by uniqueness in Sym+d of solutions to (48).
Since in general the limit of a sequence in Sym+d is only semi–definite, we further exploit the
continuous dependence of the eigenvalues on the coefficients of the matrix. For k large enough,
by (55),
min
{
spec(RΣNk)
}
>
1
2
min
{
spec(H) ∩ (0,+∞)
}
> 0 ,
and this implies
min
{
spec(RΣ)} ≥ 1
2
min
{
spec(H) ∩ (0,+∞)
}
> 0 .
Recalling again that R is symmetric positive definite, Σ cannot have zero as eigenvalue and
this proves that the limit of ΣNk is Σ. Since we can repeat this argument to show that every
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subsequence of ΣN has a convergent subsequence whose limit is Σ, we conclude that ΣN → Σ
as N → +∞.
Concerning the convergence of µN to µ, we know that these vectors are respectively solutions
to the linear systems
B′NµN = P ′N , B∞µ = P∞ ,
where B′N was defined in (40), B∞ was defined in (51), and the vector P ′N , P∞ are given, as in
the previous sections, by
P ′N = −QNH + (1−N)
BN
2
∆ , P∞ = −QˆH + Bˆ
2
∆ .
Here we use that the matrix B∞ is invertible by (U∞). Owing to B′N → B∞, it follows that
B′N is invertible as well for N large enough. In particular, for such N , µN = (B′N )−1P ′N , and
we can pass to the limit as N →∞ proving that µN → µ.
Finally, by passing to the limit in the explicit formulas (36) and (39)
ΛN = R
(
νΣN +A
)
, ρN = −RνΣNµN ,
λiN = F˜
i
0 − (µN )T
ΣNνRνΣN
2
µN + tr(νRνΣN + νRA) ,
it is easy to verify that ΛN → Λ, ρN → ρ and λiN → λ for each i. Now we can pass to the
limit in the formulas of the quadratic-Gaussian solutions (54) and deduce the convergence of
the value function and of the invariant measure from the convergence of the coefficients, and
this completes the proof. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 4. For any m, n ∈ P2(Rd)(
Vˆ [m]− Vˆ [n]
)
(x) =
∫
Rd
[
(x −H)T Bˆ
2
(ξ −∆) + (ξ −∆)T Bˆ
2
(x−H)
]
d(m − n)(ξ)
+
∫
Rd
(ξ −∆)T Cˆ(ξ −∆) d(m − n)(ξ)
+
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dm(ξ)
)T
Dˆ
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dm(ξ)
)
−
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dn(ξ)
)T
Dˆ
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dn(ξ)
)
.
Observe that only the first term of this expression depends on the variable x. Then∫
Rd
(
Vˆ [m]− Vˆ [n]
)
(x) d
(
m− n)(x) =∫
Rd
∫
Rd
[
(x−H)T Bˆ
2
(ξ −∆)
]
d
(
m− n)(x) d(m− n)(ξ)
+
∫
Rd
∫
Rd
[
(ξ −∆)T Bˆ
2
(x−H)
]
d
(
m− n)(x) d(m− n)(ξ) .
The first term can be written as∫
Rd
∫
Rd
[
(x −H)T Bˆ
2
(ξ −∆)
]
d
(
m − n)(x) d(m − n)(ξ)
=
(∫
Rd
x d
(
m − n)(x))T Bˆ
2
(∫
Rd
ξ d
(
m − n)(ξ)) .
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The second term can be treated in the same way, leading to∫
Rd
(
Vˆ [m]− Vˆ [n]
)
(x) d
(
m− n)(x) = (∫
Rd
x d
(
m − n)(x))T Bˆ (∫
Rd
x d
(
m− n)(x))
It is now clear that if Bˆ is positive definite, then
∫
Rd
(
Vˆ [m]− Vˆ [n]
)
(x) d(m − n)(x) ≥ 0 for
all probability measures m, n. Viceversa, for every fixed vector η ∈ Rd, we can consider the
multivariate Gaussian measures m = N (η, Id) and n = N (0, Id) on Rd, and apply the inequality
above to obtain
0 ≤
∫
Rd
(
Vˆ [m]− Vˆ [n]
)
(x) d(m − n)(x) = ηT Bˆ η ,
which implies Bˆ ≥ 0. This completes the proof of the equivalence between monotonicity of the
operator Vˆ and the positive semi-definitess of Bˆ. The uniqueness of solutions when Bˆ ≥ 0 can
be proved by the same arguments of [2, 30, 32]. ⋄
Remark 5.2 We believe that, in general, the assumptions (43) and (E∞) do not ensure condi-
tion (E′) with Q = QN , for N large enough, mostly because the equation (42) is equivalent to
the symmetry of ΣNνR−RA, and this property is easily lost under small perturbations. When
condition (E′) is violated, it would be interesting to verify whether the strategy resulting from
the solution to (45) could provide an ε–Nash equilibrium for the N–player game, by using the
techniques from [24, 25, 36]. However, this investigation is beyond the scope of this paper and
is left to a future work.
Remark 5.3 An interesting open issue is the rate of convergence of the solutions if the order
of convergence of the data in (43) is given. In the general case the rate of convergence of
ΣN → Σ does not follow from our analysis. However an estimate can be obtained when we
have an explicit formula for the solution of the Riccati equation, as in the examples presented
in Section 6, where it is possible to prove that ‖Σ−ΣN‖ = O(‖Q−QN‖). See also Remark 14
of [2] on the possibility of expanding explicit solutions in powers of 1/N .
6 Examples
So far we have used the abstract condition (E) with (U) to translate the existence and unique-
ness of solutions having the form (21) to the system of PDEs (15) into algebraic matrix equa-
tions. In this section we show that in some cases such conditions can be easily verified and
the solution to the PDEs (15) can be computed explicitly. For simplicity we limit ourselves
to nearly identical players and the Mean-Field game. Therefore we focus on the corresponding
conditions (E′) and (U′).
In the last part we discuss some consensus models for which infinitely many solutions can
be exhibited.
6.1 Symmetric system
Consider an N–players game with dynamics (1) and costs (2) and assume that (H) holds, that
players are nearly identical and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
(a) the dynamics (1) involve drift matrices Ai ≡ A ∈ Symd and diffusion matrices σ = sId
with s ∈ R \ {0};
(b) the matrix R in the control costs (2) satisfies R = rId with r > 0.
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Then it is easy to verify the part of (E′) concerning solutions of (41) and (42). Indeed, both
matrices
ν =
s2
2
Id =: ν¯Id
and R commute with any other matrix. Then, Sylvester’s equation (42) can be rewritten as
r
(
A−AT ) = r ν¯ (Y − Y ) = 0 ,
i.e. it reduces to a symmetry condition on A, which is ensured by (a). Moreover, an explicit
expression of the matrix Σ can be calculated. Indeed, the matrix 2r Q + A
2 is symmetric and
positive definite and thus admits a square root E ∈ Sym+d , i.e.,
E2 :=
2
r
Q+A2 .
If we now consider the ARE (37), we find that
r
ν¯2
2
Σ2 = Q+
r
2
A2 =
r
2
E2 ,
which implies
Σ =
1
ν¯
E =
1
ν¯
√
2
r
Q+A2 .
To verify the part of condition (E′) dealing with the matrix B′, we assume in addition, using
the notations of Lemma 4.1,
(c) the primary costs of displacement Bi in Q
i satisfy Bi = B ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Then we can rewrite (40) as
B′ = Q+ r
2
A2 +
N − 1
2
B =
r
2
E2 +
N − 1
2
B ,
so B′ is invertible and both (E′) and (U′) are satisfied. Thus the linear system (38) has the
unique solution
µ = (B′)−1
(
QH +
N − 1
2
B∆
)
,
where H and ∆ are the reference positions of the players, as in Definition 4.1. Now the expres-
sions found for Σ and µ can be used in (36) and (39) to obtain Λ, ρ and λ1, . . . λN , completing
the explicit construction of the unique solution of quadratic–Gaussian type.
In conclusion, for games with N nearly identical players which satisfy (H), conditions (a),
(b) and (c) are sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique solution to (15) of the form (35),
and hence of a unique affine Nash equilibrium strategy given by
α(x) = Ax+ E(x− µ) .
For the large population limit we assume that the scaled coefficients satisfy (43) as N → +∞
and
(a∞) A ∈ Symd, ν = ν¯Id with ν¯ > 0;
(b∞) R = rId with r > 0;
(c∞) Bˆ ≥ 0.
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Once again, Sylvester’s equation reduces to the symmetry of A, the solution to ARE (48) can be
given explicitly as Σ = 1ν¯
√
2
r Qˆ+A
2, and the invertibility of B∞ = Qˆ+ r2 A2+ Bˆ2 is immediate.
Moreover, it is easy to verify that ΣN → Σ and that µN → µ, which in turn imply convergence
of the unique solution to the N–players game to the unique solution of the Men-Field game (44).
Remark 6.1 The equivalence between A symmetric and Sylvester’s equation implies that if A
is not symmetric condition (E′) fails and therefore no solution of (15) with a quadratic value
function exists. Indeed, in this case one gets an affine vector q(x) = Λx + ρ which solves,
together with a multivariate Gaussian m, the equation
−tr(ν D2m)− div
(
m
∂H
∂p
(x, q)
)
= 0 ,
but q is not the gradient of a quadratic function of the form (35), because Λ /∈ Symd.
6.2 Non–defective system
In this section we extend the previous analysis beyond the symmetry assumption on the drift
matrix A to the case of A non–defective. We recall that a matrix M ∈Matd×d(R) is said to be
non–defective if, for every eigenvalue λ ∈ spec(M), the corresponding eigenspace has dimension
equal to the multiplicity of λ or, equivalently, when there exists a base of Rd consisting of right
(or left) eigenvectors of M .
Proposition 6.1 Let M be any d× d real matrix. Then the following properties hold.
(i) There exists an invertible and symmetric symmetrizer for M , i.e. there exists a matrix
Y ∈Matd×d(R) such that
det(Y ) 6= 0 , Y T = Y , Y M =MTY .
(ii) If M is non–defective, then the symmetrizer Y can be chosen positive definite.
(iii) If M is non–defective, σ is invertible and we consider a linear stochastic differential
equation
dxt = (Mxt − αt)dt+ σdWt , (56)
then there exists a linear change of coordinates x 7→ ξ such that (56) can be rewritten in
the form
dξt = (M˜ξt − α˜t)dt+ σ˜dWt , (57)
with M˜ symmetric matrix and σ˜ invertible.
Sketch of the proof. We refer to [39] for the proof of (i). (ii) Bhaskar proved in [12] that the
real symmetrizer Y can be chosen of the explicit form Y = (U−1)TV T , where U and V are
d × d (complex) matrices having as columns left and right eigenvectors of A, respectively. By
orthogonality between left and right eigenvectors, it is immediate to see that V TU = I, and
hence that
Y = (U−1)TV T = V V T
is real and positive definite.
(iii) By choosing P ∈Matd×d(R) orthogonal such that
Y = PTDP ,
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with D diagonal, and Z ∈ Sym+d such that D = Z2, one can verify that the linear change of
coordinates ξ = ZPx = Z−1PY x allows to rewrite the stochastic linear equation in the required
form (57) with
M˜ := Z−1PYMPTZ−1 , α˜ := ZPα , σ˜ := ZPσ .
This completes the proof. ⋄
Observe that, if we consider a differential game with N nearly identical players, dynamics (1)
and costs (2) and if we assume that the drift matrix A is non–defective, then we can perform
the change of coordinate in Proposition 6.1 to pass to a new SDE with symmetric drift. Let
us denote, as in the proof of the proposition, with Y = PTZ2P the symmetrizer matrix for M
with P orthogonal matrix and Z diagonal and positive definite matrix. Then, the new game
will have costs given by
J˜ i(Ξ, α˜1, . . . , α˜N ) := lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
(α˜it)
T R˜α˜it
2
+
N∑
j,k=1
(Ξj − Ξij)T Q˜ijk(Ξk − Ξi
k
) dt
 ,
where the new variables Ξ ∈ RNd and α˜1, . . . , α˜N ∈ Rd satisfy for k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
Ξk = ZPXk , α˜k = ZPαk ,
and the matrices R˜ and Q˜ijk are given by
R˜ = Z−1PRP−1Z−1 , Q˜ijk = Z
−1PQijkP
−1Z−1 ,
for the same matrices Z ∈ Sym+d and P orthogonal used to symmetrize A. One can easily verify
that replacing (a) and (b) with
(a′) dynamics (1) are given by drift matrices Ai ≡ A with A non–defective and diffusion
matrices σ = sPTZ−1 with s ∈ R \ {0};
(b′) matrix R in control costs (2) satisfies R = rY with r > 0;
it is possible to repeat the arguments of Sect. 6.1, after the change of coordinates ξ = ZPx,
and to prove that for games with N nearly identical players satisfying (H), (a′), (b′) and (c)
there exists a unique solution to (15) of the form (35). Similar conditions in the case of A only
non–defective can be given for the limit problem (44) as well.
Remark 6.2 These arguments apply to general N–players games too, without the assumption
of nearly identical players, whenever all drift matrices A1, . . . , AN are symmetric or simultane-
ously symmetrizable (i.e., if the symmetrizers Y 1, . . . , Y N given by Proposition 6.1 coincide).
For more general games one has either to require that more blocks of the cost matrices Qi are
null or to study the Nd dimensional linear SDE for Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t ).
6.3 Consensus models
In this section we apply the previous theory to some simple models of consensus in multi-agent
systems inspired by [36] to which we refer for motivations and bibliography. Consider costs
whose part depending on the state is
F i(X1, . . . , XN) =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
(X i −Xj)TPN (X i −Xj), i = 1, . . . , N, (58)
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with PN ∈ Sym+d . Then each player seeks a position as close as possible to the positions of the
other players. Note that F i has the symmetry property (S) and the blocks of the matrix Qi
are the following, in the notations of Section 5,
QN = PN , BN = − 2
N − 1P
N , CNi =
1
N − 1P
N , DNi = 0, (59)
and reference states H = ∆ = 0.
Assume also that the dynamics and cost of the control is the same for all players, so that
they are nearly identical. For simplicity suppose also the conditions (a) and (b) of Section 6.1,
although the analysis can be carried over to merely non-defective matrices A.
The matrix B′ defined in (40) is
B′ = PN + r
2
A2 + (N − 1) B
N
2
=
r
2
A2 ∀N,
and the equation (38) for the mean µ ∈ Rd of the distribution of the players is B′µ = 0. Then
the condition (E′) holds and the existence part of Theorem 2 proves the following:
there exists an identically distributed quadratic-Gaussian solution (vN ,mN , λN ) with mN ∼
N (µ,Σ−1N ) if and only if µ is such that Aµ = 0.
Moreover, the covariance matrix is the same for all µ
ΣN =
1
ν¯
√
2
r
PN +A2 , (60)
and the Nash feedback equilibrium is
αN (x) = Ax+
1
ν¯
√
2
r
PN +A2 (x− µ) .
In particular, there is a unique solution if and only if detA 6= 0 and then the mean is µ = 0.
The large population limit is straightforward if we assume that PN → Pˆ > 0 as N → ∞.
Condition (43) is satisfied with
Qˆ = Pˆ Bˆ = −2Pˆ Cˆ = Pˆ Dˆ = 0
and passing to the limit in (60) one gets Σˆ = 1ν¯
√
2
r Pˆ +A
2. Then the Mean-Field Games PDEs
(44) have a solution (v,m, λ) with m ∼ N (µ, Σˆ−1) if and only if µ ∈ Rd is such that Aµ = 0.
Remark 6.3 The paper by Nourian et al. [36] uses a cost term of the form
F i(X1, . . . , XN ) :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xi − 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Xj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
, i = 1, . . . , N,
instead of (58). Then QN = Id and B
N = − 2N−1Id. Although the secondary costs are different,
this is a special case of the above, with PN = Id for all N . In fact B′ is the same and
ΣN = Σˆ =
1
ν¯
√
2
r Id +A
2, so we get the same conclusions on the quadratic-Gaussian solutions
of N -person as well as Mean-Field game.
Remark 6.4 The existence of infinitely many Gaussian solutions in a Mean-Field Game model
of population distribution with rewarding imitation among players was first observed by Gue´ant
[22]. In [2] the LQ Mean-Field Game of Section 5 was studied for d = 1, A = 0, and H = ∆ and
it was observed that for Qˆ 6= −Bˆ/2 there is a unique quadratic-Gaussian solution with µ = H ,
whereas for Qˆ = −Bˆ/2 there are infinitely many, one for any µ ∈ Rd.
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Remark 6.5 Analogous computations can be made also for consensus models where the dy-
namics and cost of the control are not the same for all players. In such a case, the matrix B′
above is replaced by the matrix B defined in (16) which becomes here
B = 1
N − 1

√
P
...√
P


√
P
...√
P

T
− diag
(
N P
N − 1 +
(A1)TR1A1
2
, . . . ,
N P
N − 1 +
(AN )TRNAN
2
)
(61)
i.e., B a “block–rank–one” perturbation of a Nd×Nd block–diagonal matrix, with d× d blocks
− N PN−1 − (A
α)TRαAα
2 . It is easy to verify that, if there exists ξ 6= 0 in
⋂N
α=1Ker(A
α), then
η := (ξ, . . . , ξ)T ∈ RNd provides a solution to Bη = 0, which is (32) for this model. Therefore,
in this case we find infinitely many Gaussians solutions mi ∼ N (µi, (Σi)−1) for each player i =
1, . . . , N , with µi = ξ and Σi solving (28). In fact, owing to known formulas for matrices of the
form (61), it is possible to prove that the invertibility of B is equivalent to ⋂Nα=1Ker(Aα) = {0},
providing a complete understanding of the conditions required to have a unique QG solution
for this consensus model.
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